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Text Me:
A Text-Based Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)
Jennifer L. Casd
INTRODUCTION
A federal prisoner seeking to collaterally attack his convictions and sentences
faces a "complex journey".2 He must make it past temporal and procedural hurdles:
Is his claim timely? Was the claim properly preserved? Is this the first opportunity
to raise the claim? If not, is this one of the few cases in which a second or
successive claim is allowed?3 Regardless of the merits of the prisoner's claim, such
threshold requirements must be met. Then, and only then, will a court reach the
prisoner's substantive argument.
But, the prisoner's journey does not end with these temporal and procedural
hurdles; the prisoner must wrap his claim in the correct legal clothing-that is, he
must decide whether his claim is a collateral attack on his sentence or a challenge to
the conditions of his confinement. The former is presented to the courts through a
motion, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255; the latter is presented in a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. But, there is
one exception-one instance where a § 2241 claim can be cloaked in the clothing
created for § 2255 motions: Rarely, and only rarely, a prisoner can collaterally
attack the imposition of his sentence in a § 2241 petition even though such a claim
should otherwise be brought in a § 2255 motion.
This Article explores that exception. That is, this Article examines the critical
link that allows a prisoner to bring an otherwise unauthorized § 2241 petition to
collaterally attack the imposition of his sentence. That link is codified in § 2255,
subsection (e).
'University of Georgia School of Law, J.D.; Duke University, B.S.E. © 2014, Jennifer L. Case.
2 Peter Hack, The Roads Less Traveled: Post Conviction ReliefAlternatives and the Antiterrorism
and 3Effective Death PenaltyAct of 1996, 30 AM. J. CRiM. L. 171,173 (2003).

Id.
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Although it is critical to understand the contours and connections of § 2255(e),
the circuit courts have struggled mightily to interpret that statutory provision. In
their struggle, the courts have developed no less than twelve tests-one for each
circuit-for determining how and when a prisoner can avoid restrictions on filing a
§ 2255 motion by presenting his claim in a § 2241 petition.4
The plethora of circuit court tests is well-documented, but the courts' near
complete failure to anchor their many tests to the text of § 2255(e) is not. This
Article fills that gap. It examines the text of § 2255 and proposes a text-based
reading of subsection (e). By providing a textual foothold, this Article aims to help
courts and litigants regain traction by offering a way to remain faithful to the
congressionally-enacted words of § 2255(e) without producing court-created tests
that are unmoored from the statute's text.
Part I provides a brief history of the writ of habeas corpus at common law and
as codified in § 2241. Part II describes how Congress attempted to relieve § 2241's
venue limitations by enacting § 2255. Part II also describes how Congress has
modified § 2255 since its 1948 enactment.6 Part III explains the interplay between
the current codification of the statutory writ (i.e., § 2241) and its venue-shifting
sister (e.g., § 2255). Part IV highlights the circuit courts' struggle to interpret
§ 2255(e) and its Savings Clause. And, Part V outlines a way to end that struggle
by providing a text-based interpretation of § 2255(e) that is anchored in the
statute's text and consistent with its purpose.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Before delving into the statutory text of § 2255, we begin with a bit of history.
This history will allow us to anchor our interpretative undertaking in the overall
habeas corpus scheme and, ultimately, will illustrate that this Article's proposed
text-based reading of § 2255(e) is consistent with the Constitution, habeas corpus
principles, and congressional intent.
Borrowed from English common law, the writ of habeas corpus has played a
central role in our system of justice. It is known as the "Great Writ" and "protect[s]
•.. individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints."7
The rhetoric surrounding the writ is high-spirited: "one of the most, if not the
single most, important part of the Constitution which protects individual rights";'
"[t]he most celebrated writ in the English law";9 and a "great constitutional
4 See generally Jennifer Case, Kaleidoscopic Chaos: Understanding the Circuit Courts' Various
Interpretationsof § 2255's Savings Clause, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 1 (2014) (describing the hodgepodge
of rules developed by the circuit courts).
5 See generally id.
6 Unless otherwise specified, references in this article to U.S. Code are to the Code's current
codification.
7
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
' Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 749
(1987).
93 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 129 (4th ed. 1770).
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privilege."" ° "At least some of [our] romance [with the writ] is due to the ancient
roots of the remedy."" Although its roots are planted in a distant past, its meaning,
purpose, and scope have evolved for centuries.
A. English Common Law

2

The writ of habeas corpus began-sometime before the thirteenth century-13 _
as a process by which a court compelled the attendance of parties whose presence
would facilitate its proceedings. 4 The writ was a judicial order directing that a
person be brought before a tribunal at a certain time and place." Thus, in its
infancy, the writ protected the King's jurisdiction over his subjects and ensured
compliance with royal law.' 6
Over time, the writ's purpose transformed, and it became an important tool to
ensure the legality of detention by the sovereign.' By the mid-fourteenth century,
it was an independent proceeding to challenge illegal detention"5 and eventually
became known as the Great Writ of Liberty.' This version of the writ allegedly
provided the "procedural underpinning of the guarantees of the Magna Carta-an
effective remedy for imprisonment by the Crown without judicial authorization."' °
In 1641, England gave every arrested person immediate access to the writ.1
The writ was intended to ensure access to "a judicial determination of the legality

Exparte Bolman, 8 U.S. (1 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
u Hack, supra note 2.
12 "The history of the writ has been the subject of a great deal of scholarly debate and criticism."
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.1(b) n.21 (3d ed. 2013).
" The first known use of the writ of habeas corpus was in 1305. Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA's Wrecks:
Comity, Finality, and Federalism,82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 446 n.9 (2007) (citing Paul M. Bator, Finality
in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 445 n.6
(1963)).
14LAFAVE ETAL., supra note 12, § 28.1(b).
15DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA: DUALISM OF POWER AND
LIBERTY 7 (1966). The writ takes its name from the Latin phrasing of its directive: that the court would
"have the body." Id.
16 NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 3 (2011).
10

17Id.

" LAFAVE ETAL., supra note 12, § 28.1(b).
19See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 131-38 ("[T]he great and efficacious writ, in all manner of
illegal confinement, is that of habeas corpus.... ."); A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 212-17 (8th ed. 1926) (discussing the historical background and
effects of the writ); see also Prigg v. Com. of Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 619 (1842).
"' LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 28.1(b); see also 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 133; DICEY
supra note 19, at 214-16; 9 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 112-14 (3d ed.
1926).
21 WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 47 (1980) (stating
that the Habeas Corpus of Act of 1641 (Eng.) "provided that if anyone were imprisoned by any court..
. or by command or warrant of the King..., he was to have a writ of habeas corpus upon demand to
the judges... 'without Delay' ").
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of [a prisoner's] detention." 22 However, procedural difficulties undermined that
access and, as a result, England passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.23 That Act
"reinforced judicial authority to use the writ to release persons illegally detained by
availability-at common
the Crown[]."24 However, the Act's effect on the writ's
2
law-to persons convictedof crimes is hotly debated. 1
Some argue that one could use the writ "at common law to challenge her
imprisonment based on a conviction obtained in violation of due process."26 Others
argue that the common law writ only provided an avenue for challenging the
convicting court's jurisdiction or the Crown's illegal detention. 27 Regardless of the
limited
proper interpretation, it is fair to say that the common law writ had
21
usefulness as a remedy for a person detained after she had been convicted.
B. Post-ColonialEra
Our founders valued the writ to such an extent that they brought it to
post-colonial America. 29 The writ is expressly mentioned in the U.S.
Constitution." ° At the Constitutional Convention, the Framers debated whether
and how to include a constitutional provision addressing the writ.3 Eventually, the
Framers decided not to include an affirmative guarantee of the writ; instead, they
included a provision prohibiting the writ's suspension.32 That provision, known as
the Suspension Clause, provides: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it." "

22LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 28.1(b); see also DUKER, supra note 21.

3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 28.1(b) n.11 (referencing 31 Car. 2, c.2 (1679) (Eng.)); see
generally HOLDSWORTH, supra note 20, at 117-18 (discussing the Act's legislative history); Clarke D.
Forsythe, The HistoricalOrigins ofBroad FederalHabeas Review Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1079, 1095-1101 (1995) (discussing the 1679 Act as well as its history).
24 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 28.1(b) (emphasis added).
25 Id.

' Id. (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963)).
27Id. § 28.1(b).
25 Id.

29See Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-1865,32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 247-51

(1965) (discussing the incorporation of the writ in post-colonial America via state constitutions).
30U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, d. 2.
31Max Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Reflection ofSocietal Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 338-39
(1983); see also Marc D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus Proceduresand Long-Term Executive
Detention, 86 DENV. U.L. REV. 961, 981 (2009) (describing how some of the Framers did not think it
necessary to include suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the Constitution and quoting James
Madison's Notes ofDebates in the FederalConvention of 1787.).
32 Rosenn, supra note 31, at 338; see also Hack, supra note 2, at 174 (explaining how the Framers
to adopt the current text of the Suspension Clause).
decided
33
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, d. 2.
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The first Congress-in its first session-expressly gave federal courts the power
to grant writs of habeas corpus to prisoners in federal custody.3 4 That act did not
permit federal courts to grant writs to prisoners in state custody.35 The reach of
habeas at the time of the founding is still debated.36 However, at the very least, "the
writ was subject to restrictions developed in the common law."37
C. Nineteenth Century
Throughout the early nineteenth century, Congress gradually expanded
statutory access to the writ. For example, in 1833, Congress allowed state prisoners
held for an act that they committed pursuant to federal law to seek a writ.3 After
the Civil War, Congress again expanded the reach of the writ when it enacted the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. 3' For the first time, federal courts had the power to
grant writs of habeas corpus when "any person [is] . . . restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the [C]onstitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States." 4°Thus, the1867 Act broadened federal judicial authority and allowed
federal courts to review state court judgments imposed in violation of federal (not
state) law.41
In the 1870s and 1880s, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the 1867 Act in
several cases, ultimately concluding that the 1867 Act provided a fairly broad scope
of review of criminal convictions and sentences.4 2 For example, the Supreme Court
' Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)
(Supp. III 1949)) (giving federal courts the "power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an
inquiry into the cause of commitment").
" Id. (stating that federal courts could not grant the writ unless a prisoner was "in custody, under or
by colour of the authority of the United States").
36 Compare Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: PartI: Just BecauseJohn Marshall
Said It Doesn't Make It So: Ex Parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of
Habeas Corpus for State Prisonersin the JudiciaryAct of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531, 554-58 (2000)
(arguing that federal courts had inherent power to grant writs of habeas corpus to both federal and state
prisoners at the time of the founding), with INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that federal courts have no inherent power to grant the writ).
37Hack, supra note 2, at 174.
3' Jesse Choper & John Yoo, Wartime Process: A Dialogue on CongressionalPower to Remove
Issues from the Federal Courts, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1243, 1280 (2007) (citing Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch.
57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634-35 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2) (2012)).
" Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-386 (adding the language "in any
State court") (relevant provision codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (Supp. III 1949)). The
modern successor to the 1867 Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012 & Supp. 1 2014).
o Id. (emphasis added); see also Choper &Yoo, supra note 38, at 1280 (citing § 1, 14 Stat. at 385)
("Congress did not expand habeas to include cases where prisoners claimed they were held in violation
of federal rights until 1867."). For an analysis of habeas corpus jurisprudence during Reconstmcrion, see
Ann Woolhandler, DemodelingHabeas,45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 596-629 (1993).
41 See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. at 385; see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note
12, § 28.1(b) (discussing how the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 broadened the authority of federal
courts).
' See KING &HOFFMANN, supranote 16, at 108-09 (discussing how § 2255 offered an alternative
to habeas for federal prisoners).
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held that the 1867 Act permitted habeas relief where the Double Jeopardy Clause
was violated,43 where the defendant was charged with violating an unconstitutional
statute," and where the petitioner was convicted without an indictment from a
grand jury.45
D. Twentieth Century
Congress's objectives in adopting the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 were (and
still are) hotly debated.46 In the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a broad
interpretation of the 1867 Act's purposes.47 In so doing, the Court noted that the
writ was capable of growth to meet "changed conceptions of the kind of criminal
proceedings so fundamentally defective as to make imprisonment pursuant to them
constitutionally intolerable."48
But-as seems to be the only constant with habeas jurisprudence-the tide
turned. And, by the mid-1970s, the Court began to narrow its interpretation of
the habeas statute. 49 This trend continued throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s. 5" Interestingly, Congress did not help the Court in its endeavor to uncover
" See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (1 Wall.) 163, 164 (1873) (taking the position that habeas corpus
can be used in double jeopardy cases).
4 See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1879) ("An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no
law. An offence created by it is not a crime.")
45 See Ex parteWilson, 114 U.S. 417, 429 (1885) (granting habeas relief when petitioner was
sentenced for violation of an "infamous crime, within the meaning of the fsfth amendment ... without
indictment or presentment by a grand jury .... .).
' See Paul M. Bator, Finalityin Criminal Law and FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners,76
HARV. L. REV. 441, 463 (1963); see also Forsythe, supra note 22, at 1079-84; James S. Liebman,
Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/DirectReview Parity, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2041 (1992); Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme
Court as Legal Historian,33 U. CHI. L. REV. 31, 45 (1965); David McCord, Visions of Habeas,1994
BYU L. REV. 735, 735 (1994); Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 581 (1982); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court
and the Congress,44 OHIO ST. L.J. 367,367 (1983); Woolhandler, supranote 40, at 596-602.
47 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1963) (holding that federal courts have authority to
review claims that were procedurally defaulted in state court); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 314
(1963) (holding that federal courts can hold evidentiary hearings if the state court's fact-finding process
was defective); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 12 (1963) (holding that a petitioner can, under a
variety of circumstances, file more than one habeas petition); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953)
(rejecting the notion that the state court's decision on the merits of a federal constitutional claim was res
judicata); Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 500 (1953) (stating that the scope of the federal court's review
was de novo); see also John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite," 91 CORNELL L. REV.
259, 262-63 (2006) (noting that these four cases establish the "highwater mark" in liberal interpretation
of the federal courts' habeas power).
" Noia, 372 U.S. at 414.
4
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 252-53 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)
(characterizing "Noia's version of the writ's historic function" as resting upon a "revisionist view of the
historic function"). A few years later, a majority of the Court formally rejected the Noia Court's broader
interpretation of the writ. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976).
" See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992) (introducing rigid definitions of "actual
innocence" for reviewing errors in the guilt phase of criminal trials and capital cases); McCleskey v.
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the 1867 Act's scope. Although it added various provisions to the habeas statute,
Congress never clarified the core statutory authorization provided in the 1867
51
Act.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF

28 u.s.c. § 2255

"For over a century, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 [codified in relevant part,
and as amended, at 28 U.S.C. § 2241] provided the basic statutory framework for
federal habeas relief for state prisoners." 52 And, despite significant changes since the
Act's enactment,53 the history of a prisoner's access to the writ via the Act (and the
Act's use in federal courts) "continue[s] to inform the [Supreme] Court's
application of the contemporary commands of Congress."5 4 Now that we have
reviewed that history and understand some of the key components of the 1867 Act
(i.e., § 2241), we are equipped to understand its statutory sister (and the heart of
this article): 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
A. Section 2255's Purpose:Relieve the Statutory Writ's Venue Limitations
The 1867 Act required a prisoner to file her writ of habeas corpus in the federal
district court having jurisdiction over her place of confinement. 5 Though
seemingly innocuous, this venue requirement created problems. First, it resulted in
a work-allocation imbalance: federal habeas petitions inundated the dockets of
those few federal courts whose divisions had federal prisons.5 6 Second, it created a
Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991) (requiring a demonstration of cause and prejudice when asserting claims
not included in earlier writs); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (establishing the
non-retroactivity doctrine for new rules of criminal procedure where case is final); Kuhlmann v. Wilson,
477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (narrowing reviewability of successive petitions to cases "with a colorable
showing of factual innocence"); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982) (requiring total exhaustion of
all claims); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (requiring a showing of cause and prejudice to
overcome procedural default).
" For example, Congress codified the "state exhaustion" requirement, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A) (1996), passed the venue-shifting statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2008), and specified
the conditions under which a federal court must provide an evidentiary hearing or honor a state court's
factual finding, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2008).
52LAFAVE ETAL., supra note 12, § 28.2(b).

11Id. § 28.1(b).
54Id. § 28.1(b); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659-63 (1996) (discussing how the Act
expanded the Court's jurisdiction on habeas petitions); Oaks, supra note 29, at 245-46 ("Although the
federal constitution and statutes contain detailed provisions on habeas corpus, the leading federal

decisions have relied heavily on history and on the common law."); Jordan Steiker, Innocence and
FederalHabeas,41 UCLA L. REV. 303, 309 (1993) (noting the "extensive historiography surrounding
federal habeas" jurisprudence).
s See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213 (1952).
56 Id. at 213-14 (noting that judges in districts containing "major federal penal institutions ... were
required to handle an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions far from the scene of the facts, the
homes of the witnesses and records of the sentencing court[s]"). The Supreme Court in Hayman noted
that, at the time of § 2255's enactment, sixty-three percent of habeas petitions filed by federal prisoners
were filed in only five district courts. Id. at 214 n.18.
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physical-proximity problem: given that federal prisons-and, thus, habeas
courts-were often far from the sentencing court,
habeas petitioners had limited
57
access to relevant records, witnesses, and evidence.
To disperse the workload associated with collateral attacks more evenly and to
ensure that the proceedings would be conducted in closer proximity to the relevant
records and witnesses, the Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus
Procedure s" proposed a bill to Congress that would require that federal prisoners
first challenge their convictions and sentences in the court that sentenced them. 9
In 1948, Congress took up and passed that bill, which was codified (and remains
codified) at 28 U.S.C. § 2255.60
Once enacted, § 2255 provided an alternative to the statutory writ of habeas
corpus by allowing federal prisoners to attack their convictions and sentences
through a motion "to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."61 This motion
applied (and still applies) to any situation in which a federal prisoner may raise a
collateral attack.

62

63
Section 2255 is a practical alternative to the statutory writ's venue limitations.
It does not alter the scope of review of the traditional habeas procedure; 64 it simply
modifies the venue. The scope of review provided
by § 2255 is identical to the
6
scope of review for a federal writ of habeas corpus. 5
But, as a practical matter, the statutory interplay between § 2241 (the federal
statutory habeas corpus provision) and § 2255 (the venue-modifying provision) had
51See id. at 213-14.
58

The Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure was established to assess the

procedural difficulties in habeas corpus litigation, particularly with respect to federal prisoners. Id. at
214.
'9See id.at 214-19 (discussing recommendations made by the Judicial Conference Committee).
'oAct of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 967-68 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012)); see KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 16, at 108-10 (discussing the
legislation proposed to address the "'practical difficulties' created by . . . petitions from federal
prisoners").
61 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. II 1948). This language remains in the current version of § 2255. 28
U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012).
' Hayman, 342 U.S. at 216-17. When the committee submitted its findings, it recommended the
enactment of the precursor to § 2255. See id. at 214-18. The committee issued a statement in support
of its recommendation, explaining that the proposed legislation "creates a statutory remedy consisting of
a motion before the court where the movant has been convicted.... The motion remedy broadly covers
all situations where the sentence is 'open to collateral attack.' As a remedy, it is intended to be as broad
as habeas corpus." Id. at 217-18. Additionally, the Reviser's Note on the 1948 version of § 2255 states
that the statute "provides an expeditious remedy for correcting erroneous sentences without resort to
habeas corpus." Id. at 218 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 79-2646, at 7 (2d Sess. 1946)).
63 See id. at 219 ("[T]he sole purpose [of enacting § 2255] was to minimize the difficulties
encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more convenient
forum.").
' See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1969) (examining the scope of the writ).
65 See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 217, 219 ("Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any
purpose to impinge upon prisoners' rights of collateral attack upon their convictions."); see
also Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 221 (noting that the history of the statute suggests that the legislation was
not meant to restrict the scope of review).
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an obvious and intended result: "[T]he § 2255 motion . . . displaced the writ of
habeas corpus under § 2241 as the basic collateral remedy for persons confined
pursuant to a federal criminal conviction."66
B. Overview of§ 2255
Section 2255 provides a procedure whereby a prisoner in custody under the
sentence of a federal court may move the court to "vacate, set aside or correct [a]
sentence." 67 Unlike a habeas petition, a § 2255 motion is filed in the court that
sentenced the prisoner, not the district of detention. 61 Section 2255 also requires
that federal prisoners use it as a vehicle to challenge their convictions or sentences
district courts from hearing habeas corpus
"by explicitly prohibiting federal
69
petitions filed by such prisoners."
Although § 2255's statutory language suggests that a § 2255 motion can only
challenge the sentence itself, the portion of § 2255 that governs the granting of
relief indicates otherwise. It allows the court to "set the judgment aside and . . .
discharge the prisoner."7° Given this language-and in light of the legislative
history surrounding § 2255-the term "sentence" is treated as a generic term that
includes all of the proceedings leading up to the sentence.7" Therefore, using a
§ 2255 motion, a prisoner can attack the conviction underlying her sentence and
the proceedings that resulted in that conviction.7 2 A prisoner can also use a § 2255
motion to assert that (1) "the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States," (2) "the court was without jurisdiction to impose
[the] sentence," (3) "the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law," or (4) the sentence "is otherwise subject to collateral attack."73
Section 2255 restricts a federal prisoner's access to the writ of habeas corpus
codified in § 2241. 74 This prohibition, however, contains one exception that has
66 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 28.9(a).

6728 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012).
61 See id. § 2255(e).
69 Nicolas Matteson, Note, Feeling Inadequate?: The Struggle to Define the Savings Clause in 28
U.S.C. § 2255, 54 B.C. L. REv. 353, 359 (2013); see § 2255(a) (providing that "[a]n application for a
writ of habeas corpus... shall not be entertained if it appears that the [prisoner] has failed to apply for
relief... to the court which sentenced him").
§5 2255(b).
7' See Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974) (noting that legislative intent was
that § 2255 provide a remedy "identical in scope" to that previously provided under habeas provisions
codified in §§ 2254 and 2241). For a detailed treatment of relief under § 2255, see 3 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & SARAH N. WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL §§ 621-637
(4th ed. 2011).
72 See United States v. Payne, 644 F.3d 1111, 1113 n.2 (10th Cir. 2011) ("[T]his court has
repeatedly and consistently applied § 2255 to challenges to convictions."); see also WRIGHT &
WELLING, supra note 71, § 625 (noting that the Supreme Court has read the term "sentence" in § 2255
"as a generic term including all of the proceedings leading up to the sentence").
' 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
74See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that, if the remedy under § 2255
is "ineffective to test the legality of his detention," a "prisoner can seek habeas corpus under 2241").
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existed since § 2255 was enacted in 1948 and that is highly relevant to this article:
§ 2255(e) and its so-called "Savings Clause."7 5
The Savings Clause was proposed by the Judicial Conference Committee on
Habeas Corpus Procedure.7 6 However, Congress selected different language than
the committee had proposed.77 Concerned with practical considerations, the
committee proposed prohibiting a prisoner from filing a § 2241 habeas petition
unless it was not "practicable to determine his rights to discharge from custody on
[a § 2255] motion because of his inability to be present at the hearing on such
motion, or for other reasons."7s But, as enacted, the Savings Clause contains much
broader language: a federal prisoner cannot bring a federal habeas corpus petition
"unless ... the remedy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
79
legality of his detention."
Courts have taken Congress's enactment of this more expansive Savings Clause
language as an indication that Congress rejected the narrow formulation of the
Savings Clause presented by the Judicial Conference Committee. 0 In so doing,
courts have concluded that Congress intended for the Savings Clause to apply to
situations beyond practical difficulty."'
Beyond Congress's rejection of the Judicial Conference Committee's proposed
sheds no additional light on the
savings-clause language, the legislative 8 history
2
scope of § 2255(e) or its Savings Clause.
C. AEDPA 's Amendments to

§ 2255

Section 2255 remained unchanged for decades.5 3 "Between 1986 and 1995,
members of Congress introduced [scores of] bills proposing habeas [corpus] reform

Habeas corpus remains available as the procedure for federal prisoners challenging the execution of their
sentence, as distinguished from those challenging the basis of conviction and imposition of a sentence.
Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 755-56 (6th Cir. 1999).
75 Compare Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 967-68 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012)), with 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012).
76 See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing the legislative history of
§ 2255 and the recommendations of the Judicial Conference Committee).
7' Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1239, 1241 (11th Cir. 1999).
71United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 215 n.23 (1952) (quoting language from section two of
the proposed bill).
7 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012).
80 See, eWofford, 177 F.3d at 1241; see also Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 375 (2d Cir.
1997) (discussing the rejection of language that would have narrowed the Savings Clause).
sl Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1241; Triestman, 124 F.3d at 375.
82 See Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1241 & n.2.
s Congress altered the terminology of the first unnumbered paragraph slightly in 1949. See Act of
May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 114, 63 Stat. 89, 105 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012))
(changing "court of the United States" to "court established by Act of Congress").
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The principal focus of those bills was to impose a statute of limitations for
federal habeas relief 15 None of those bills became law. 6
During this same time period-and in the face of growing concern and
criticism regarding the ineffectiveness of habeas procedure-Chief Justice William
Rehnquist created the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital
Cases. 7 The committee explored the "the necessity and desirability of legislation
directed toward avoiding delay and the lack of finality in capital cases."" s After its
review, the committee issued a report noting several problems with the thenexisting federal habeas system. Problems highlighted by the committee included
delay, repetition, and lack of finality. s9 Despite a thorough review, the committee's
report did not spark congressional action.9" But, as is often the case, a national
tragedy did.
In 1996, one year after the terrorist attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).9" According to Congress, AEDPA was intended to
"curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus, and to address the acute
92
problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in capital cases."
"Among other things, [AEDPA] amended both 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (which
governs [motions] for collateral relief by federal prisoners) and 28 U.S.C. § 2244
(which governs second and successive habeas corpus petitions)."93

.

D. Overview ofAEDPA 's Amendments
AEDPA narrowed the basic provisions of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 by
significantly altering the rules governing collateral relief for state and federal

14 See Scott R. Grubman, What A Relie? The Availability of Habeas Relief under the Savings
Clause of Section 2255 of the AEDPA, 64 S.C. L. REv. 369, 378 (2012) (stating that congressmen
proposed more than eighty bills).
s Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 333 (1996); see also Lisa L. Bellamy, Playing for Time: The
Need for Equitable Tolling of the Habeas Corpus Statute of Limitations, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 10
(2004) ("Congress embarked on a campaign for habeas corpus reform ...").
s"Bellamy, supra note 85, at 10 n.70 (citing Lonchar,517 U.S. at 333).
17 Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex Procedurefor a Simple Process, 77

MINN. L. REv. 1015, 1048 (1993) (citing Report on Habeas Corpus in CapitalCases, 45 Crim. L. Rep.
(BNA) 3,239, 3,239 (Sept. 27, 1989) [hereinafter Habeas Report]).
88HabeasReport, supra note 87.
89Id. at 3,239-41.
90 Lay, supra note 87, at 1063.
91Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 107, 110 Stat.
1214, 1221-26 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (2012)).
' Limin Zheng, Comment, Actual Innocence as a Gateway Through the Statute-of-Limitations
Bar on the Filing of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions, 90CALIF. L. REV. 2101, 2111
(2002) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
924, 944).
9'Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 1997).
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prisoners in capital and non-capital cases.9 4 In particular, AEDPA "imposed
significant new constraints on proceedings under [§] 2255."g9 Among other
things,96 AEDPA barred late petitions; 97 narrowed relief for claims raised in second
petitions; 9 made the courts of appeal, rather than the district courts, the
gatekeepers of determining whether a second petition can be filed; 99 required that
prisoners obtain a "certificate of appealability" prior to appealing a district court's
denial of a § 2255 motion;' 00 limited state prisoners' access to federal evidentiary
hearings;'' and required federal courts to defer to reasonable state court
interpretations and applications of established federal law.'0 2
Notwithstanding AEDPA's comprehensive amendments to § 2255 and its
significant restrictions on post-conviction relief, AEDPA did not alter any part of
§ 2255(e), including its Savings Clause)' Other than providing alphabetical
designations to each paragraph, Congress has not changed § 2255 since it enacted
AEDPA in 1996.104
III. THE CONTEMPORARY STATUTORY §

2241

WRIT AND §

2255 MOTION

In their current forms, § 2241 and § 2255 "each create mechanisms for a federal
prisoner to challenge his detention."105 But, "the two sections offer relief for
different kinds of perceived wrongs. "106 Section 2255 provides an avenue for a
federal prisoner to "challenge the imposition of his [conviction and] sentence" (i.e.,
94Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 107; see also Lyn S. Entzeroth,
Struggling for Federal Judicial Review of Successive Claims of Innocence: A Study of How Federal
Courts Wrestled with the AEDPA to Provide Individuals Convicted of Non-Existent Crimes with
Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75, 87 (2005) (stating that AEDPA "created significant
restrictions on a federal prisoner's ability to actually move a federal court for [§ 2255] relief').
" Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d 85, 96 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Some of these constraints were
temporal; for example, AEDPA established a one-year statute of limitations for filing a section 2255
petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Some of these constraints were numerical; for example, AEDPA required
a federal prisoner who sought to prosecute a second or successive section 2255 petition to obtain
pre-clearance, in the form of a certificate, from the court of appeals. Id. § 2255(h).").
96 For a more exhaustive list of AEDPA's effect on habeas proceedings, see generally Blume, supra
note 47.
"' See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 §§ 105-106 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1), 2255(f) (2012)).
sSee id. §§ 101-105 (codified as amended at §§ 2244(b)(1), 2255(h)).
See id. § 102 (codified as amended at § 2244(a)).
o See id.(codified as amended at § 2253(a), (c)(1)(b)).
o See id. § 104 (codified as amended at § 2254(e)(2)).
502 See id. (codified as amended at § 2254(d)(1)).
103 See Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d 85, 96-97 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Although section 2255, as
amended, provides a comprehensive remedial scheme for post-conviction relief, that scheme perpetuates
the savings clause contained in section 2255(e).").
1o4 See Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, § 511, 121 Stat. 2534,
2545 (Jan. 7, 2008) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012)) (enumerating the undesignated
paragraphs as (a) through (h)).
'0S
Adams v. United States, 372 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cit. 2004).

Id.

106
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the fact of confinement).1 °7 By contrast, § 2241 provides an avenue for a federal
prisoner to challenge the execution of his sentence (i.e., the conditions of
confinement).'
For example, a prisoner can use a § 2241 petition to seek relief
from things like prison conditions, disciplinary actions imposed by the prison
warden, or decisions to deny parole. 9
In addition, § 2241 grants federal courts authority to entertain habeas petitions
from prisoners "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States."" 0 This language creates an apparent overlap between § 2255 and
§ 2241. Nevertheless, courts have consistently ruled that a federal prisoner
"generally must invoke § 2255 instead of § 2241 to challenge a sentence as
violating the U.S. Constitution or laws.""'
The remainder of this Article explores what happens in the non-standard
situation; that is, when does § 2255(e) allow a federal prisoner to challenge his
sentence in a § 2241 petition?
IV. CIRCUIT COURTS' STRUGGLES TO INTERPRET § 2255(e)

For nearly two decades, circuit courts have fumbled with the meaning of the
2
twenty simple words at the end of § 2255(e), the so-called Savings Clause:"
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion,
to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless
it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the

legaltyofhis detention."3

But, much of this struggle was self-induced. When courts first endeavored to
interpret the Savings Clause, they bypassed the statutory text in and around the
clause and headed straight to § 2255's legislative history." 4 Unsurprisingly,
Congress provided no historical breadcrumbs, leading the courts to frustratingly
conclude: "[T]he statute says precious little about what it means ...to have been
'inadequate' or 'ineffective.' "115
"' Id.; accord Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474 (2d Cit. 1997) (citation omitted) ("A

petitioner seeking to challenge the legality of the imposition of a sentence by a court may therefore make
a claim pursuant to Section 2255.").
"' See Adams, 372 F.3d at 134-35 (contrasting the effects of pursuing relief under § 2255
(imposition of a sentence) vs. § 2241 (execution of a sentence)).
109 Id. at 135 (citing Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001)).
11028 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2012).
11 See, e.g., Adams, 372 F.3d at 135 (emphasis added).
112See generally Case, supra note 4 (describing the hodgepodge of rules developed by the circuit
courts).

11328

U.S.C. § 2255(e) (emphasis added to highlight the Savings Clause).
114See, e.g., Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1238-42 (11th Cir. 1999) (reprinting the statutory
text but jumping immediately into a lengthy discussion of the history of the statute's enactment).
115Williams v. Warden, 713 F.3d 1332, 1341 (1lth Cir. 2013).
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A dearth of useful statutory definitions or precise and trustable legislative
history is par for the course." 6 It is not unique to § 2255 or the Savings Clause
itself. Courts often rely on their own wits and the tools of statutory construction to
divine the meaning of statutory provisions. Yet, somehow, when it came to
understanding § 2255(e) and its Savings Clause, the circuit courts consistently set
dependable statutory interpretation tools aside and crafted their own obstacle
courses of requirements and threshold tests. They required circuit foreclosure,. 7
"fundamental defect[s],""'
"busting" circuit precedent," 9 and "serious
0
constitutional questions,"12 -all terms and concepts completely missing from
§ 2255 in general or the Savings Clause in particular. The courts' sustained efforts
to give meaning to the Savings Clause without reviewing the plain text of § 2255
produced a fascinating display of doctrinal drift-an object lesson in what can
happen when supposed statutory interpreters lose sight of the statute's letter and
spirit.
And, unsurprisingly, when left to their own devices, the circuit courts failed to
agree on the Savings Clause's meaning. By charting paths shaped more by the
peculiar contingencies of prior precedents than by the first principles of statutory
construction, court developed "tests" and interpretations unique to each circuit,
leaving federal prisoners geographically stratified-with some prisoners virtually
unable to access § 2241 through § 2255's Savings Clause and other prisoners more
easily reaching § 2241 by way of § 2255(e)."'

1" Accord United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319-20 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("I should concur in this result more readily if the Court could reach it by analysis of the
statute instead of by psychoanalysis of Congress.... Legislative history here as usual is more vague than
the statute we are called upon to interpret.").
117See, e.g., Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
"savings clause of § 2255 applies to a claim... that was foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the
claim should have been raised in the petitioner's trial, appeal, or first § 2255 motion."); In re Davenport,
147 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 1998) ("It would just dog the judicial pipes to require defendants, on pain
of forfeiting all right to benefit from future changes in the law, to include challenges to settled law in
their briefs on appeal and in postconviction filings."); see also, e.g., Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1244
(adopting the Davenport court approach, but noting that "[w]e adopt it insofar as . . . [t]he savings
clause of § 2255 applies to a claim when ... circuit law squarely foreclosed such a claim at the time it
otherwise should have been raised in the petitioner's trial, appeal, or first § 2255 motion.").
.1.See, e.g., Davenport,147 F.3d at 611 ('A federal prisoner should be permitted to seek habeas
corpus only if he had no reasonable opportunity to obtain earlier judicial correction of a fundamental
defect in his conviction or sentence because the law changed after his first 2255 motion.").
119 See, e.g., Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1245 (holding "that the only sentencing claims that may
conceivably be covered by the savings clause are those based upon a retroactively applicable Supreme
Court decision overturning circuit precedent.").
121 See, e.g., Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that the Savings
Clause may be triggered where "the failure to allow for collateral review would raise serious
constitutional questions"); see also, e.g., In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Were no
other avenue of judicial review available for a party who claims that s/he is factually or legally innocent
as a result of a previously unavailable statutory interpretation, we would be faced with a thorny
constitutional issue.").
1' See generally Case, supra note 4 (providing several hypotheticals highlighting these disparities).
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Quite possibly-if the circuit courts had interpreted the Savings Clause by
examining (1) the clause's text, (2) the text of the surrounding provision (i.e.,
§ 2255(e)), and (3) the overall framework of § 2255-the courts would have
reached similar conclusions (rather than irreconcilable tests) that applied to all
federal prisoners, regardless of the physical location where the prisoners were
sentenced or confined.

22

The remainder of this Article attempts to do what the circuit courts repeatedly
have not: consider the ordinary meaning of § 2255(e)'s text. Circuit courts have
not made a full-throated attempt at interpreting the ordinary meaning of the
provision's key terms, such as "inadequate," "ineffective," "test," and "detention."
Believing such a task is possible-and necessary-let us begin.
V. TEXT-BASED INTERPRETATION OF

§ 2255(e)

A. Section 2255 Then and Now
23
Any good statutory interpretation journey begins by, well, reading the statute.1
In this case, the key first step is to examine both the text and structure of § 2255 as
originally enacted and the textual and structural changes imposed thereafter.
Section 2255 originally had seven (7) unnumbered paragraphs.1 24 With one
minor exception not relevant to this article,'12 the first, third, fourth, sixth, and
seventh paragraphs remain in the current version of § 2255. As enacted, § 2255
stated:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the
prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served
upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the
issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If

122 See generally id. (explaining the geographic stratification in the availability of access to § 2241

through § 2255(e)'s Savings Clause).
123 See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) ("The task of resolving the
dispute over the meaning of [the statute] begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language
of the statute itself." (citation omitted)).
124See generally28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. II 1948).
125 See Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 114, 63 Stat. 89, 105 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C
§ 2255(a) (2012)) (replacing "court of the United States" in the first unnumbered paragraph with "court
established by Act of Congress").
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the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the
sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral
attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional
rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the
court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or
resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear
appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the
production of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive
motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on the
motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion,
to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless
it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.12

Until it was modified by AEDPA in 1996, § 2255 remained unchanged.
AEDPA removed the second and fifth paragraphs of § 2255 and added three (3)
new paragraphs. 127 Specifically, AEDPA replaced a prisoner's ability to file a
§ 2255 motion for relief at "any time"12 with a limited timeframe for filing such
motions. 129 AEDPA also replaced the provision that a court "not be required to
entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same
prisoner"' 30 with strict limits on when a court can entertain second or successive
petitions.' Finally, AEDPA added a provision to permit the appointment of
counsel.

132

In its current form, § 2255 provides:
(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was ii excess of
the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.
12'28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. II 1948).
127See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 105, 110

Stat. 1214, 1220 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012)).
12S28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. II 1948) (referencing the second unnumbered paragraph).
129See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 105.
130 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. II 1948) (emphasis added) (referencing the fifth unnumbered
paragraph).
131See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 105.
132See id.
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(b) Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be
served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon,
determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without
jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise
open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of
the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to
collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall
discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the
sentence as may appear appropriate.
(c) A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the
production of the prisoner at the hearing.
(d) An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on the
motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
(e) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion,
to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless
it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.
(f) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by
governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by
such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme
Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(g) [Appointed-counsel provision.
article.]

Omitted as unnecessary to this

(h) A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section
2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of
the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by dear and
convincing evidence that no reasonable factfmnder would have found
the movant guilty of the offense; or
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(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable. 33
'

Other than labeling the paragraphs (a) through (h) for ease of reference,' 34
Congress has not changed the provisions of § 2255 since AEDPA was enacted.
This Article provides the full text of § 2255 because one must appreciate the
statute's structure and its various provisions to properly interpret the meaning of
subsection (e).
B. Section 2255(e)
Section 2255(e) provides-as it always has:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion,
to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless
it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.'35

This language has not changed since it was originally enacted in 1948.136
However, since Congress added subsections (g) and (h) in 1996, the meaning of
subsection (e) has perplexed federal courts.' 37
If one skips the statute's text and enters directly into the kaleidoscopic morass
of meanings given to § 2255(e) by the circuit courts, it is easy to think that the
statute's language is inherently ambiguous and amenable to an unlimited line of
reasonable interpretations. 3 ' It is not.
1.

Subsection (e)'s Authorization Clause.-The first portion of subsection (e)

states that "Ia]n application for a writ of habeas corpus ...shall not be entertained"
if (1) a prisoner failed to move the sentencing court for relief or (2) the sentencing
court denied such relief.'39 This is simple enough. A habeas court need only look at
the sentencing court's docket to determine whether the petitioner filed a § 2255
motion and, if so, whether relief was denied.

However, there is more to this first portion of subsection (e)-cleverly hidden
by the ellipses in the quoted portion above and often overlooked by circuit courts.
Specifically, the ellipses cloak the fact that courts determine whether they can
13328 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012).

"3Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, § 511, 121 Stat 2534, 2545
(Jan. 7, 2008) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012)).
135 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012) (emphases added).
136Compare28 U.S.C. § 2255 7 (Supp. II 1948), with 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012).
131See generally Case, supra note 4 (discussing the wide array of tests developed by the circuit
courts for interpreting the Savings Clause in § 2255(e)).
138See generallyid.
139 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012).
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entertain a habeas petition only if a prisoner "isauthorized to apply for relief by
motion pursuant to this section" (hereinafter "Authorization Clause"). 4 That is,
subsection (e) operates to bar a § 2241 habeas petition only if § 2255 authorizes the
prisoner to bring a § 2255 motion. Importantly, if the Authorization Clause is not
satisfied, subsection (e)
plays no role in determining whether a prisoner can bring
1
his habeas petition.

14

2. Subsection (a): Scope of the Motion.-To determine whether a prisoner is
authorized to apply for relief pursuant to § 2255, one must look to the remainder of
the statute. Subsection (a) allows any "prisoner in custody under sentence of a
[federal] court" to bring a motion to "vacate, set aside, or correct" a sentence if
(1) the "sentence was imposed in violation of [federal law]," (2) the sentencing
court lacked "jurisdiction to impose the sentence," (3) the sentence exceeds "the
maximum authorized by law," or (4) the sentence "is otherwise subject to collateral
attack." 142 In short, a prisoner can bring a § 2255 motion to collaterally attack his
43
sentence or the proceedings leading to that sentence.
Looking only at subsection (a), it is clear that subsection (e)'s Authorization
Clause is satisfied by almost any challenge to a conviction or sentence because
subsection (a) authorizes a prisoner to bring a § 2255 motion for a generously
broad range of collateral attacks. Subsection (a) has existed since § 2255's
inception.'44 So, until Congress added temporal and numerical limitations to
subsection (a) in 1996,14 the Authorization Clause inquiry was fairly
straightforward: subsection (e)'s Authorization Clause was almost always satisfied
by the expansive reach of subsection (a). But this is no longer the case.
3. Subsequent Amendments to § 2255.-Under the original version of § 2255, a
prisoner could bring a motion at "any time," 14 6 and nothing restricted a court from
"entertain[ing] a second or successive motion for similar relief." 147 Consequently,
unless the sentencing court elected not to entertain a second or successive § 2255
motion, a prisoner was "authorized" to bring such motion, 4 ' so subsection (e)

14 See id.

141See id.
142Id.

§ 2255(a).

141See Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 340, 346-47 (1974) (holding that the defendant's

collateral attack in a § 2255 motion was appropriate).
'" See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 967 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012)).
141See Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d 85, 96 (1st Cir. 2008) (discussing constraints imposed
by AEDPA).
1-28 U.S.C. § 2255 2 (Supp. II 1948).
147Id. § 2255
5. To see how the language in the original version aligns with the modern version,
compare § 2255 5, with 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2013).
148See id. § 2255 7.
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almost always operated to block a prisoner's § 2241 petition. The only exception
motion was "inadequate or
occurring when the remedy from that authorized
149
ineffective to test the legality of his detention."
This all ended in 1996 when Congress enacted AEDPA, dramatically changed
§ 2255's framework, and, by extension, altered how one must read subsection (e).
Post-AEDPA, multiple provisions of § 2255 (i.e., subsections (f) and (h)) limit the
otherwise broadly permissive language of subsection (a).1 °
i. Subsection (10: Limitations Period.-First,there is now a one-year limitations
period: Subsection (f) requires that a prisoner bring his § 2255 motion within one
year of several triggering events.151 The most common triggering event is the date
of the final judgment of conviction.15 2 But, other triggering events can extend the
limitations period. For example, the limitations period extends one year from the
date that (1) a government-imposed impediment to bringing a § 2255 motion is
removed;5 3 (2) a newly recognized, retroactively applicable right is first recognized
by the U.S. Supreme Court; 5 4 or (3) facts supporting the claim are diligently
discovered. 155
Thus, in a post-AEDPA world, subsection (e)'s Authorization Clause is not
satisfied "any time" that a § 2255 motion is filed.' 56 Instead, a prisoner's § 2255
motion must be timely.'57 If the motion is timely (and other requirements, such as
the limit on successive motions, are met), a prisoner is "authorized" to bring his
motion pursuant to § 2255.15 In such a case, subsection (e) would plainly prohibit
a prisoner from bringing a § 2241 habeas petition.
ii. Subsection (h): Limit on Second or Successive Motions.-Second, subsection
59
(h) dictates when a prisoner can bring a "second or successive" § 2255 motion.' A
prisoner can only bring a second or successive § 2255 motion if a circuit court
certifies that the motion contains (1) "newly discovered evidence" that would
prevent all reasonable factfinders from finding the prisoner guilty or (2) a new,

149 Id.

IoSee Trenkler, 536 F.3d at 96 (discussing constraints imposed by AEDPA via subsections (f) and

(h)).
1

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2012).

1

Id. § 2255(0(1) (requiring that the judgment of conviction to be "final" before the limitations

period begins to run). There are several things that determine finality; however, they are irrelevant for

the purposes of this analysis.
1 Id. § 2255(f)(2) (requiring that the government's action be "in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States" and that the government's action have prevented filing the 2255 motion).
154 Id. § 2255(0(3) (requiring the right to be made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review).
Id. § 2255(0(4).
155
2 (Supp. 1 1948) (allowing motion at "any time").
156 Id. § 2255(e). But see 28 U.S.C. § 2255
117 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2012).
1s See generally id. § 2255.
159Id. § 2255(h).
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previously unavailable "rule of constitutional law" made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the U.S. Supreme Court.160
If a prisoner secures certification from the appropriate appellate court (and
other requirements, such as timeliness requirements, are met), subsection (e)'s
Authorization Clause would be satisfied.'61 In such case, a prisoner would be
"authorized" to bring his motion pursuant to § 2255, and subsection (e) would
plainly prohibit a prisoner from bringing hii § 2241 habeas petition.
In short, after AEDPA, a prisoner only makes his way past subsection (e)'s
Authorization Clause to reach the remainder of that statutory provision if she
makes a timely initial motion or if she makes a timely second or successive motion
that is predicated on either newly discovered evidence or a new rule of
constitutional law. In all other circumstances where a prisoner seeks to bring a
§ 2241 habeas petition, subsection (e)-by the plain language of its Authorization
Clause-prohibits the prisoner from bringing that petition.
If that is true, how is it that the circuit courts reach such wildly different
outcomes regarding the meaning of § 2255(e)? Quite simply, the courts skipped
right past the Authorization Clause and jumped straight to the last twenty words of
§ 2255(e)-the so-called "Savings Clause." That is, the courts consistently and
(e) forbids all § 2241 petitions unless and until
collectively assume that subsection
162
the Savings Clause applies.
This is an incorrect interpretation of § 2255(e). Or, more precisely, it is a
failure to even consider-much less interpret-critical statutory text.
4. Subsection (e)'s Savings Clause.-The Savings Clause that the circuit courts
have so desperately tried to parse contains these twenty words of subsection (e):
"unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of his detention. " "' But, a reader who looks at subsection (e) in total
reaches the Savings Clause only after reading almost sixty other relevant words and
only if she first determines that the Authorization Clause is satisfied.
In its simplest form, subsection (e) bars a § 2241 habeas petition if the prisoner
is authorized to bring that claim in a § 2255 motion "unless it also appears that the
remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention."164 Thus, there is at least a two-step inquiry: (1) Is the prisoner
authorized to bring a § 2255 motion? Is so, she cannot bring a § 2241 habeas
petition. (2) And, if the prisoner is so authorized, is the Savings Clause satisfied?
If so, the prisoner may bring her § 2241 petition; if not, the prisoner remains
6

1 0 Id.
161 See generallyid.
162

See, e.g., Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 900-03 (5th Cit. 2001) (jumping

straight to § 2255(e)'s Savings Clause without examining the remainder of § 2255(e)); In re Dorsainvil,
119 F.3d 245, 248-49 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 371-74 (2d
Cit. 1997) (same).
1- 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
164See id.
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barred from bringing the petition. Thus, a court reaches the Savings Clause only
after it has first concluded that the Authorization Clause is satisfied.'
With that framework in mind, interpreting the Savings Clause is fairly
straight-forward: either a prisoner's authorized § 2255 motion is adequate and
effective to test the legality of his detention-in which case the prisoner must bring
his claim in a § 2255 motion-or it is not-in which case a prisoner is not
precluded from bringing his § 2241 habeas petition.
Given this textual reading, the wrenching and wrestling that the circuit courts
have done with the Savings Clause is simply unnecessary. And, lest the reader
wonder when in the world a § 2255 motion could be "inadequate or ineffective," at
least one circuit court has provided examples of the rare instances where an
authorized § 2255 motion is truly inadequate to test the legality of one's
detention.166
C. Other Textual Support
There are other textual clues that support this text-based interpretation of
§ 2255(e)-many of which the circuit courts have overlooked.
1. "Sentence" versus "Detention.'--On its face, § 2255 is a tool for challenging a
sentence:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.' 67

But, courts have interpreted § 2255(a)'s use of the term "sentence" to include all
proceedings leading to a sentence, including the actual conviction and the
proceedings leading to that conviction. 6 s
In contrast to the broad conviction-and-sentence-based scope of § 2255(a),
§ 2255(e) provides that a federal prisoner can file a habeas petition only where
§ 2255 is available but inadequate to challenge the legality of her detention:

165 See

supra Part V.B.1.

166 See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 588 (10th Cir. 2011) (describing instances where "the

defendant's sentencing court had been abolished by the time the prisoner sought to bring his initial
collateral attack" and where the sentencing court in a court martial proceeding "dissolve[d] after
sentencing and [was] no longer available to test a prisoner's collateral attack" (citations omitted)).
16728 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (emphasis added).
168 See United States v. Payne, 644 F.3d 1111, 1113 n.2 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting that courts
repeatedly and consistently appl[y] § 2255 to challenges to convictions").
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An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by [§ 2255] motion .. shall not be entertained if
[certain conditions are met] ... unless it also appears that the remedy by motion
169
is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

When "Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
170
omits it in another . . . [courts presume] that Congress act[ed] intentionally."
Since § 2255's inception, Congress has used "sentence" in one part of the statute
and "detention" in another. 17 1 Thus, the statute should be read with the
presumption that Congress was distinguishing between two different types of
challenges-the broad conviction-and-sentence-based challenge described in
subsection (a) and the narrow detention-based challenge described in subsection
(e)'s Savings Clause.
A federal prisoner attacking his sentence may challenge the validity of the
proceedings that resulted in his sentence, but a prisoner attacking his detention
1 72
may only challenge the execution of that sentence.
"Detention" differs from a criminal "sentence." When Congress enacted § 2255
in 1948, "detention" meant "[k]eeping in custody or confinement" 173 or "[tihe act of
keeping back or withholding, either accidentally or by design, a person or thing." 74
Thus, for example, a pretrial detainee can challenge his detention because he is in
"custody or confinement" even though he has not been tried.' 75 Or, a federal
prisoner can challenge his detention by raising claims about his good-time credits
or the revocation of his parole, both of which involve the Executive's "act of
176
keeping back or withholding" the prisoner.

16928

U.S.C. § 2255(e) (emphasis added).

170Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (citation omitted).
171Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2255
1, 7 (Supp. II 1948), with 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), (e) (2012).
172

C£ Antonelli v. Warden, 542 F.3d 1348, 1351 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008) ("It is well-settled that a

§ 2255 motion to vacate is a separate and distinct remedy from habeas corpus proper.... A prisoner in
custody pursuant to a federal court judgment may proceed under § 2241 only when he raises claims
outside the scope of § 2255(a), that is, claims concerning the execution of his sentence.").
1733 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 266 (1st ed. 1933) [hereinafter OED 1933]; accord4
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 545 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter OED 1989] (defining
"detention" similarly in the edition applicable to the 1996 passage of AEDPA).
174BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 569 (3d ed. 1944) [hereinafter BLACK'S 1944]; accord BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 569 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLACK'S 1990] (defining "detention"-in the
edition applicable to the 1996 passage of AEDPA-as "[t]he act of keeping back, restraining or
withholding").
...See, e.g., Braden v. 30th Jud. Cit. Ct., 410 U.S. 484, 488-90, 498 (1973) (holding that an
Alabama prisoner under a Kentucky indictment could file a habeas action under § 2241 seeking to
enforce his constitutional right to a speedy trial); Santamaria v. Horsley, 133 F.3d 1242, 1243 (9th Cir.
1998) (reviewing pretrial habeas petition under § 2241(c)(3)), amended by 138 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir.
1998).
176SeeJiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cit. 2001) (noting that a prisoner can use § 2241 to
challenge "such matters as the administration of parole, computation of [his] sentence by prison
officials, prison disciplinary actions, prison transfers, type of detention and prison conditions").
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This understanding of the term "detention" comports with the separation of
labor that Congress created between the court that sentenced a prisoner and the
court in the district where the prisoner is confined (i.e., the habeas court).
Congress's 1948 adoption of § 2255 did not impinge a prisoner's right to
collaterally attack her sentence; it simply provided a new venue for the collateral
attack.'77 Thus, it makes sense that-through § 2255(e)-the only types of
challenges that Congress allows to be brought (in the court whose only connection
to the prisoner is its geographic proximity to the prison where the prisoner is
confined) are challenges to that prisoner's "detention"-that is, challenges related
to the very act of confinement itself. And, it makes sense that Congress requires
that a prisoner bring all other attacks on her conviction or sentence in the court
where the prisoner was actually adjudged guilty and sentenced to a term of
imprisonment.
2. "To Test" the Detention'sLegality.-A prisoner may file a habeas petition in the
court geographically proximate to the place of his confinement if a remedy from an
authorized § 2255 motion "is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
means "to try" 179 or "to
detention."' 7 This phrase is quite limited: "To test"
180
ascertain the truth or the quality or fitness of a thing."
Applying these definitions to the § 2255 context, it becomes clear that whether
may "test" a claim about the legality of his detention is separate from
prisoner
a
whether he wins or loses that claim. A prisoner can test his claim if he has an
opportunity to raise that claim for examination. Thus, in the context of § 2255, "to
test" the legality of one's detention means only that a prisoner needs the
opportunity to raise an argument about the legality of his detention.' It does not
mean that he is entitled to re-raise-or, more precisely, re-test-his argument if he
loses his first challenge.
Returning to our text-based reading of § 2255(e): If a prisoner is authorized to
file a § 2255 motion but somehow is unable to file that motion because, for
example, the sentencing court has dissolved, the prisoner would be unable "to test"

...
See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The purpose behind the enactment of
section 2255 was to change the venue of postconviction proceedings brought by federal prisoners from
the district of incarceration to the district in which the prisoner had been sentenced.").
17828 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012) (emphasis added).
17911 OED 1933, supra note 173, at 220; accord 17 OED 1989, supra note 173, at 828 (defining
"test" similarly in the edition applicable to the 1996 passage of AEDPA).
110BLACK'S 1944, supra note 174, at 1720; accord BLACK'S 1990, supra note 174, at 1473 (defining
"test" similarly in the edition applicable to the 1996 passage of AEDPA).
" See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584 (10th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he clause is concerned with
the petitioner an opportunity to bring his argument-not with
process-ensuring
substance-guaranteeing nothing about what the opportunitypromised will ultimately yield in terms of
relief.").
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the legality of his detention in a § 2255 motion."8 2 In such case, § 225 5 (e) permits
the prisoner to file a § 2241 petition to raise his claim.
One example of the inability to use § 2255 "to test" the legality of detention
could occur when a claim is not cognizable in a § 2255 motion. If the claim is not
cognizable, a prisoner cannot "test" it or obtain a "remedy," as stated in § 2255(e).
For example, a prisoner cannot "test" a claim about the revocation of his parole in8 a4
§ 2255 motion. 8 3 Nor can a prisoner "test" a claim about his prison conditions.
Those claims-and others that relate to the execution of a prisoner's sentence-do
not contest that the sentence itself "was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence." 85 So, a prisoner cannot use § 2255 "to test" such claims. Instead, he
must raise such claims in a § 2241 petition for a writ habeas corpus. 18 6 And, quite
appropriately, § 2255(e) allows the prisoner to bring such claims in a § 2241
petition.'

87

Several circuit courts have conflated the prepositional phrase "to test" with the
words "to win" or "likely to win." 88 But, § 2255(e) says nothing about what result
may manifest from a § 2255 proceeding; it simply mandates that a remedy by an
authorized § 2255 motion be adequate and effective "to test" the legality of a
prisoner's detention."189
Surely Congress did not intend to allow a federal prisoner to first challenge the
legality of her sentence in the court that sentenced her (via § 2255) and then-if
she was dissatisfied with the result of the § 2255 proceeding--to again challenge
the legality of her sentence by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus in the districts
that confined her (via § 2241). It is unlikely that § 2255(e)-whose text has been
present and unaltered since § 2255's enactment-was intended to allow a prisoner
dual opportunities to test her detention's legality (the so-called second bite at the
apple). Such result would undermine the very purposes of § 2255-to disperse the
workload of district courts evenly and to ensure that challenges to convictions and
sentences occur in a venue that is most likely to have the best access to records,
witnesses, and evidence. 9' Transforming the words "to test" to "to win" (or "likely
182 See

id. at 588 (providing two examples in the Tenth Circuit for which § 2255 was inadequate or

ineffective "to test" the legality of a sentence because the sentencing courts no longer existed).
183 But see Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that such challenge is
permitted in a § 2241 petition).
184But see id. (same).
s 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012).
See, e.g., Hajduk v. United States, 764 F.2d 795, 796 (11th Cir. 1985) (dismissing a § 2255

186

motion to vacate a prisoner's sentence and requiring that the prisoner file a § 2241 petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to raise his challenge to the lawfulness of the parole commission's actions).
187See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
8 See, e.g., Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1239, 1244 (11th Cit. 1999) (deciding that, if
"settled circuit precedent" goes against a petitioner's claim, then that circuit precedent "deprived that
petitioner of any reasonable opportunity to obtain a reliable judicial determination" of his claim).
89 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
'9o See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212-14 (1952) (noting that judges in districts
containing "major federal penal institutions ... were required to handle an inordinate number of habeas
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to win") would increase the federal workload by allowing the same challenge in two
separate federal courts. That would indeed be an odd result.
3. The Linking Verb: "Is.'-Another textual mistake that the circuit courts often
make when interpreting § 2255(e)'s Savings Clause is to replace the verb "is" with
the word "was."' 9' As a reminder, the Savings Clause states: "unless it also appears
that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention."'92 Changing the operative verb from present to past tense necessarily
changes the meaning of the clause.
When the linking verb is read (as Congress wrote it) in the present tense, the
prisoner cannot access § 2241 unless § 2255 is--at the moment her § 2241 petition
is filed in federal court-inadequate and ineffective to test the detention's legality.
And, § 2241 is only inadequate and ineffective in the rare instances already
indicated in this Article.193
But, when the linking verb is read (as the courts often read it) in the past tense,
the prisoner can access § 2241 if § 2255 was-at any point in time-inadequate or
ineffective to test her detention's legality. When read in the past-tense, the linking
verb "is" allows the courts to create unwritten requirements for accessing § 2241.
For example, the Seventh Circuit allows a prisoner to access § 2241 via § 2255(e)'s
Savings Clause where, inter alia, "binding precedent" foreclosed the claim at the
time of the prisoner's first § 2255 proceeding.194 That is, the Seventh Circuit looks
to the past and asks whether § 2255-in the first instance-was flawed in some

corpus actions far from the scene of the facts, the homes of the witnesses and records of the sentencing
court[sl").
191See, e.g., Bryant v. Warden, 738 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he savings clause in
§ 2255(e) permits the prisoner to file a § 2241 habeas petition when a § 2255 motion was 'inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.'" (emphasis added)); Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d
1042, 1052 (9th Cir. 2011) (Section 2255(e) "compels a federal prisoner to file a collateral attack on his
conviction pursuant to § 2255, unless the remedy there provided was 'inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of his detention' " (emphasis added)); Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 587 (10th Cir.
2011) ("[T]he plain language of § 2255 means what it says and says what it means: a prisoner can
proceed to § 2241 only if his initial § 2255 motion was itself inadequate or ineffective to the task of
providing the petitioner with a chance to test his sentence or conviction." (original emphases omitted)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); Morales v. Bezy, 499 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2007) ("[The
prisoner] cannot show that his section 2255 remedy was inadequate or ineffective." (emphasis added));
Hill v. Morrison, 349 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he issue before this court is whether § 2255
was inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner's] conviction." (emphasis added));
Christopher v. Miles, 342 F.3d 378, 385 (5th Cir. 2003) (concluding that a prisoner could not "use the
savings clause of § 2255 to challenge his underlying conviction by petitioning under § 2241" because he
"failed to demonstrate that § 2255 was inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention"
(emphasis added)).
192 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (emphasis added).
193See Prost,636 F.3d at 588 (describing instances where § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective").
114See Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586-87 (7th Cit. 2013) (citing Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d
638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012)).
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way.' 95 The Seventh Circuit (and other circuits) can only have this retrospective
view because they assume
that the linking verb in § 2255(e)'s Savings Clause is
196
written in the past tense.
If the circuit courts treat the verb as it is codified in the statute, they would have
no statutory basis for their judicially-created rules that allow a prisoner to bring a
second challenge to the legality of his sentence where a change in the law since the
resolution of the earlier challenge may benefit the prisoner.'97 For this reason, the
textual distinction between "is" and "was" is extremely important.'98
D. Other Support for the Text-Based Interpretation
There are also several non-textual clues that support this article's proposed
text-based interpretation of § 2255(e).
1. ProperDefendant.-The proposed text-based reading of § 2255(e) is supported
by the clear distinctions between the proper parties to § 2255 motions and § 2241
habeas petitions. The proper defendant in a § 2255 motion to vacate or correct a
sentence is the U.S. government, and the motion is served on the U.S. Attorney.'99

195 See id. at 587 (allowing a prisoner to bring a § 2241 motion via § 2255(e)'s Savings Clause

because the prisoner "could not have raised his current argument in his first section 2255 motion
because it was foreclosed by binding precedent at that time" (emphasis added)).
196 See id.; see also Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1274 (allowing access to § 2241 via § 2255(e) where, inter
aia, the Eleventh Circuit's binding precedent specifically addressed and squarely foreclosed the
prisoner's claim that he was sentenced above the statutory maximum penalty); Stephens v. Herrera, 464
F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that a § 2241 petition is permissible when a prisoner, inter alia,
"has not had an 'unobstructed procedural shot' at presenting that claim" (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)).
197Interestingly, some courts also conflate "was" and "is" on the form templates that pro se prisoners
use to raise § 2241-based challenges. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF FLA., § 2241
HABEAS CORPUS PETITION FORM 3 (Jan. 2013), availableat http://www.flnd.uscourts.gov/forms/Pro
%20Se/2241-form.pdf (asking a prisoner to "[e]xplain why the remedy under § 2255 was oris inadequate or ineffective" (emphasis added)).
191Of course, there is a valid argument that the present-tense "is" gives a polar opposite meaning to
the Savings Clause. That alternative reading is: If, at any time, § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality's detention (e.g., because the motion is untimely filed, impermissibly successive, or was
denied on the merits), a prisoner is entitled to bring a § 2241 petition. This reading of the verb "is"
would permit a second bite at the apple any time a prisoner wanted it. But, that cannot be what
Congress intended. Such a reading would run completely counter to the very purpose of § 2255: to shift
the venue of post-conviction attacks to balance court workload. If a prisoner was allowed two collateral
attacks-one in the sentencing court and one in the court in the district where the prisoner is
confined-the entire purpose of § 2255 would be undermined. Thus, this alternative reading of "is" is
most assuredly wrong.
1' See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2012) ("[T]he court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the
United States attorney . . ").

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 103

The proper defendant in a § 2241 petition, which challenges the execution of a
2
sentence, is the warden who confines the prisoner. 11
Thus, a prisoner who raises sentencing challenges in a § 2241 petition not only
sues in the wrong court (i.e., by filing in the place of confinement rather than the
place of sentencing), but she also sues the wrong defendant. The warden does not
impose a prisoner's sentence or participate in any proceeding leading up to that
sentence's imposition; the U.S. Attorney does. Reading § 2255(e) to allow a
conviction-or-sentence-based challenge to pass through the Savings Clause in
§ 2255(e) and reach § 2241 puts the warden in the precarious position of defending
the prisoner's conviction and sentence even though the warden did not participate
in any proceeding leading up to the imposition of that sentence. This cannot be a
result that Congress intended, and this Article's proposed reading of § 2255(e)
largely avoids such a result.
2. AEDPA's Limitations.-Circuit courts attempting to harmonize their
interpretation of § 2255(e) with the remainder of § 2255 have consistently faced a
dilemma (whether they acknowledge it or not): the varied tests for allowing certain
sentence-based claims to pass through § 2255(e)'s Savings Clause circumvent the
bars to such motions that Congress explicitly imposed when it enacted AEDPA in
1996. In particular, Congress imposed a statute of limitations, replacing the old
provision that allowed a motion to be filed at "any time. "201 And Congress
imposed a bar on second or successive motions, 202 which was intended "to place
limits on federal collateral review."203
The proposed text-based interpretation of § 2255(e) avoids the problems that
the circuit courts' interpretations have introduced.20 4 Under this Article's reading
of § 2255, the Savings Clause comes into play if and only if § 2255(e)'s
Authorization Clause is first satisfied-that is, only when al requirements for such
a motion, including the bars to untimely motions and second (or successive)
motions, have been met. 20 ' This reading of § 2255(e) harmonizes all sections of
§ 2255 and is consistent with AEDPA's purposes to "curb the abuse of the
to address the acute problems of unnecessary
statutory writ of habeas corpus, and
6
delay and abuse in capital cases."

200

20

See id. § 2242 (stating that the prisoner must allege "the name of the person who has custody

over him" (i.e., the warden)).
201 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2012) (imposing a one-year limitations period), with 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255

2 (Supp. II 1948) (allowing a motion at "any time").

202See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2012).

v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 376 (2d Cir. 1997).
Accord Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 588-94 (10th Cir. 2011) (discussing faults with other

20' Triestman
24

circuits' non-textual interpretations of § 2255(e)).
205See supra Part V.B.
206 H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 944.
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TEXT-BASED INTERPRETATION OF §

2255(e)

3. Avoiding Constitutional Issues.-Some courts have stated that § 2255(e)'s
Savings Clause is necessary to avoid "a thorny constitutional issue" about the
suspension of habeas corpus. 20 7 Taking this as true, the proposed text-based reading
of § 2255(e) avoids such constitutional problems.
A prisoner challenging the execution of his sentence must have a forum where
he may bring that challenge, even though such a challenge could be raised long
after his sentence is imposed. 2 8 Because § 2255 clearly permits challenges to
convictions and sentences, § 2255 would impose a constitutional problem only if it
prevented a prisoner from challenging the execution of his sentence. But that is
something § 2255 does not do.
Challenges regarding good-time credits, parole revocation, or other prison
disciplinary proceedings affecting a prisoner's confinement are challenges about
executive detention. 20 9 These challenges mirror challenges brought by pretrial
detainees, who are the quintessential habeas petitioners because they have been
210
detained- by the Executive branch before courts have determined their guilt.
Such challenges to executive detention were the very kinds of challenges that the
Framers anticipated when they adopted the Suspension Clause more than 200
years ago. 21' And none of these challenges are barred by § 2255.212
Section 2255(e)'s Authorization Clause is not satisfied if a prisoner seeks to
challenge the execution of his sentence because § 2255 is not the authorized
mechanism to raise such challenges. 213 In such a case, the prisoner should file a
207 See, e.g., In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Were no other avenue ofjudicial
review available for a party who claims that s/he is factually or legally innocent as a result of a previously
unavailable statutory interpretation, we would be faced with a thorny constitutional issue."); see also,
e.g., Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377 (stating that the Savings Clause may be triggered where "the failure to
allow for collateral review would raise serious constitutional questions").
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
209SeeJiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that a prisoner can use § 2241 to

challenge such matters); United States v. Furman, 112 F.3d 435, 438-39 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that
challenges to good-time credit and parole procedure should be brought under § 2241).
211 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 533 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961) ("To bereave a man of life ... or by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation or trial,
would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny...
but confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail .. is a less public, a less striking, and
therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government." (quoting another source)); see also Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 253-55, 263, 280 (1984) (discussing a habeas corpus action challenging a New
York state statute authorizing pretrial detention); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 520, 526 (1979)
("Pretrial detainees brought suit challenging the constitutionally of numerous conditions of confinement
and practices in a federally operated short-term custodial facility.").
21 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739-46 (2008) (providing a brief account and discussion
of the history of habeas challenges and holding that the "[Suspension] Clause is designed to protect
against cyclical abuses"); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) ("[T]he essence of habeas
corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody.. .
212 See supra Part V.B.
253 See Furman, 112 F.3d at 438-39 (stating that challenges to "good-time credit and parole
procedure, go to the execution of [a] sentence" and should be brought under § 2241 (citations omitted));
Falcon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 52 F.3d 137, 139 (7th Cir. 1995) ("A petitioner who seeks a 'quantum
change' in the level of confinement must use the writ.").
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§ 2241 petition.214 Thus, the Constitution does not require courts to read new,
non-text-based, escape hatches into § 2255(e). To the contrary, § 2255(e) permits
challenges to the execution of one's sentence precisely because such challenges do
not satisfy § 2255(e)'s Authorization Clause, and § 2255(e) permits challenges to
the imposition of that sentence either through a § 2255 motion (or through a
§ 2241 petition if § 2255(e)'s Savings Clause is satisfied). That is all the
25
Constitution requires. 1
CONCLUSION

Courts have a "duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a
statute." 216 Yet when it comes to interpreting § 2255(e), circuit courts have
repeatedly shirked that duty and imposed their own, individualized, multi-step,
217
Rube Goldbergian rules to connect § 2255 motions and § 2241 petitions.
This Article proposes that we begin at the beginning, assume that Congress
meant what it wrote, and impose the rules limiting access to § 2241 that Congress
drafted into § 2255. If the circuit courts return to the basics of statutory
interpretation, they will-in all likelihood-reach the same or similar results in
their interpretive endeavors. That would benefit the judicial system because it
would ensure similar access to justice regardless of the district of sentencing or the
place of confinement.
Should Congress find that the effects of its own enacted words are contrary to
its vision and too limiting in practice, Congress can amend § 2255 to create greater
access to § 2241 when successive or untimely § 2255 motions are otherwise barred.
Such statutory re-writing is beyond the role of the courts. Courts should stick to
their mandate to interpret and apply the law that Congress enacted. Only then will
we escape the kaleidoscopic chaos that was the inevitable result of establishing rules
and requirements for access to § 2241 that were completely foreign to, and found
nowhere in, the statutory text of § 2255.

214 See Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that § 2241 "confers habeas

jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging not the validity but the
execution of his sentence" (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
215And, in case more is required, nothing in § 2255 strangles the power of the U.S. Supreme Court
to exercise its original jurisdiction to grant a writ of habeas corpus. Accord Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S.
651, 658-61 (1996) (rejecting the argument that AEDPA's restriction on second or successive § 2255
motions unconstitutionally infringes on its appellate jurisdiction because AEDPA "makes no mention of
[the Supreme Court's] authority to hear habeas petitions filed as original matters in this Court").
216United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
217 See generallyCase, supra note 4 (explaining the various tests used in each circuit court).

